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Six Randomized Evaluations of Microcredit:  
Introduction and Further Steps†
By Abhijit Banerjee, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Zinman*
Causal evidence on microcredit impacts informs theory, practice, 
and debates about its effectiveness as a development tool. The six 
randomized evaluations in this volume use a variety of sampling, 
data collection, experimental design, and econometric strategies 
to identify causal effects of expanded access to microcredit on bor-
rowers and/or communities. These methods are deployed across 
an impressive range of locations—six countries on four continents, 
urban and rural areas—borrower characteristics, loan character-
istics, and lender characteristics. Summarizing and interpreting 
results across studies, we note a consistent pattern of modestly pos-
itive, but not transformative, effects. We also discuss directions for 
future research. (JEL D14, G21, I38, O15, O16, P34, P36)
I. Motivation
Microcredit, typically defined as the provision of small loans to underserved entrepreneurs, has been both celebrated and vilified as a development tool. In 
its heyday, microcredit was the basis for the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize and embraced 
by policymakers, donors, and funders worldwide as an effective policy tool.1 But 
around this time, some observers, including many of the researchers represented 
in this volume, pointed out that the evidentiary base for anointing microcredit was 
quite thin. Various theories—of poverty traps, behavioral decision making, general 
equilibrium effects, and/or credit market competition—suggest that the impacts of 
expanding access to credit on poor people need not be positive, and could even 
be negative.2
The empirical evidence invoked by microcredit’s proponents was largely based 
on anecdotes, descriptive statistics, and impact studies that failed to disentangle 
1 An example quote from the Prime Minister of Bangladesh at the 1997 Microcredit Summit: “In our careful 
assessment, meeting the credit needs of the poor is one of the most effective ways to fight exploitation and poverty. 
I believe that this campaign will become one of the great humanitarian movements of history. This campaign will 
allow the world’s poorest people to free themselves from the bondage of poverty and deprivation to bloom to their 
fullest potentials to the benefit of all—rich and poor.” 
2 See Banerjee (2013) and Zinman (2014) for related reviews of theory and evidence on such issues. 
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causation from correlation. More recently, these same questionable methods are 
often invoked to criticize microlenders for high interest rates, serial borrowing, 
default crises, and other symptoms of debt traps.
The six studies in this volume grew out of the debates that started in the 2000s 
and continue today. They generate causal evidence on the impacts of microcredit on 
its intended users with research designs that rely on some randomness in the alloca-
tion of credit offers by individual microlenders.
Randomization permits the identification of causal effects by minimizing the 
selection biases that can confound observational studies. In the case of microcredit, 
these biases can come from both the demand-side and the supply-side, as we discuss 
in Section III. The magnitude of these selection biases is an empirical question, and 
few studies focus on estimating how important they are in practice (Beaman et al. 
2014 being an exception). Nevertheless, the studies in this volume do generate some 
circumstantial evidence of various types. Beyond the relatively obvious—compar-
ing naïve OLS estimates to those relying on experimental variation within-study, 
and comparing randomized to nonrandomized estimates across studies—models 
estimating correlations between borrowing likelihood and baseline characteristics 
also contain some useful information.
“Who borrows?” is of course the combination and demand- and supply-side 
factors, and a key question for nonrandomized identification strategies is whether 
an econometrician can plausibly capture all the important factors. The modest 
R-squareds in the borrowing-likelihood models estimated in this volume suggest 
not. It is difficult to predict microcredit use even with a rich set of baseline charac-
teristics of potential borrowers.
Aside from the use of rigorous methods for identifying causal effects, another 
noteworthy feature of the studies here is their collective spanning of contextual, 
social, and market environments, thus lending external validity to their results, espe-
cially given the consistent pattern of findings summarized below. Taken together, 
the studies cover microcredit expansions by seven different lenders in six different 
countries—Bosnia, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, and Mongolia—from 2003–
2012. These lenders, products, and settings strike us a fairly representative of the 
microcredit industry/movement worldwide. Combined with two previously pub-
lished field experiments from other settings (Karlan and Zinman 2010, 2011), the 
evidence here adds to the evidentiary base for evaluating and refining the theories 
and practices of microcredit.
Drawing lessons across the six studies has been greatly facilitated by the efforts 
of the six research teams and the editor, Esther Duflo, to make the papers readily 
comparable. Although each study was designed and implemented independently, 
all authors have exerted substantial effort in the analysis and editorial phases to 
use comparable outcomes, estimation strategies, and expositional organization. 
The data used in each study is posted on the American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics website and we encourage researchers to use it; e.g., it is well-suited for 
more formal meta-analysis than we do here.
What are the key takeaways, in our estimation? One is the existence of modest 
take-up rates of credit among (prospective) microentrepreneurs, which is a prima 
facie case against microcredit being a panacea (a cure-all) in the literal sense, 
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and presents a statistical power challenge for randomized identification strategies. 
Second is the difficulty of meeting the power challenge by predicting microcredit 
take-up (as noted above, this speaks to the likely importance of unobserved hetero-
geneity in borrowing and lending decisions, and hence to the value of  large-sample 
randomization). Third is the lack of evidence of transformative effects on the aver-
age borrower. Fourth is that the lack of transformative effects does not seem to 
be for lack of trying in the sense of investment in business growth. Fifth is that 
the lack of transformative effects should not obscure other more modest but poten-
tially important effects. If microcredit’s promise was increasing freedom of choice it 
would be closer to delivering on it. Sixth, just as there is little support for microcre-
dit’s strongest claims, there is little support for microcredit’s harshest critics, at least 
with respect to the average borrower. Seventh, the limited analysis of heterogeneous 
treatment effects in these studies does suggest hints of segmented transformative 
effects—good for some, bad for others.
Another key lesson also leads to a critical caveat: statistical power still poses 
a major challenge to microcredit impact studies. This motivates both additional 
studies and formal meta-analyses going forward. But at this moment we cannot 
emphasize enough that, at the level of individual studies, many of the null results 
described here are part of confidence intervals that contain economically meaning-
ful effect sizes of credit access in one or both directions. Given the modest take-up 
rates (“low compliance” in the program evaluation sense), the confidence intervals 
on estimates of the effects of borrowing are almost certainly much wider still. (How 
much wider is difficult to identify, for reasons we discuss below.) In short, most of 
the null results in the studies here would lack precision if they were converted into 
treatment-on-the-treated units. The individual studies may lack strong evidence for 
transformative effects on the average borrower, but they also lack strong evidence 
against transformative effects.
Another key caveat is that these studies have nothing to say about impacts on 
inframarginal borrowers. It may well be the case that impacts are substantially dif-
ferent on the borrowers and/or communities already being served before the lenders 
in these studies began experimenting on the margin. Although marginal borrowers 
are the most relevant ones for current policy, funding, and practice decisions, under-
standing effects on inframarginal borrowers definitely has value for testing theory 
and informing the design of future interventions. We could imagine experiments on 
inframarginal borrowers—e.g., on loan amounts or maturities, or by allocating repeat 
loans by lottery in settings where loanable funds are scarce—but are not aware of any.
A final caveat is that these studies do not have much to say about the benefit-cost 
proposition of expanding access to microcredit. For example, only one of the papers 
considers the (un)profitability of marginal loans for the lender.
The rest of this introduction proceeds as follows. Section II summarizes the study 
settings. Section III discusses potential biases in observational studies of microcredit 
impacts and the methods these studies use to address them, focusing on important 
nuances in the unit of randomization, data collection, and econometric strategies. 
Section IV summarizes some key takeways from the results. Section V uses some 
simple theory to help interpret the results. Section VI highlights some unanswered 
questions and directions for future research.
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II. The Microcredit Products
Table 1 summarizes the six study “settings:” characteristics of the loans, lender, 
borrower, and locations where each study took place. We present the data on time 
periods covered in Table 2, which shows start dates ranging from 2003 to 2010, 
and end dates ranging from 2006 to 2012. Of the six programs evaluated, four are 
traditional group lending, one is individual lending (Bosnia), and one includes both 
group and individual loans (Mongolia). Group sizes vary considerably across the 
studies, ranging from 3 or 4 borrowers in Morocco to as many as 50 in Mexico 
(with a minimum of ten). Each of the group lenders relies heavily on groups for 
screening and monitoring. Joint liability gives groups incentives to perform these 
functions, although anecdotal evidence indicates that lender enforcement of joint 
liability is imperfect and varies across organizations. The individual loan under-
writing relies heavily on loan officers. At least three of the lenders provide dynamic 
incentives (better terms on subsequent loans) for loan repayment. According to data 
from MixMarket.org, loan loss rates of the lenders range from 0 to 3.2 percent at 
baseline (excluding the anonymous Bosnian lender).
Each lender targets borrowers with certain characteristics. Three lend only to 
women. Most have minimum and/or maximum ages. All but one (India) targets 
microentrepreneurs. Some require explicit business plans to get loans, while others 
restrict lending (at least nominally) to people who already had a business or were 
planning to start one. However, none of the lenders actually restrict how disburse-
ments are spent or attempt to monitor whether business investment increases.
Nominal interest rates (APRs) vary from 12 percent to 27 percent with the one 
exception of Mexico, which has a rate of approximately 110 percent. Each of the 
APRs except India’s is substantially below the median market microloan interest 
rate for the country.3
Regarding nonprice loan terms, average loan sizes vary substantially in PPP 
terms across studies, from about $450 in Mexico to about $1,800 in Bosnia. Average 
loan amount as a proportion of family income ranges from 6 percent in Mexico to 
118 percent in Ethiopia. Average loan maturities range from 4 months in Mexico 
to 16 months in Morocco, with 4 of the studies falling in the 12–16 month range. 
Each lender except Ethiopia has a fixed repayment schedule, with two requiring 
weekly, two monthly, and Morocco offering a variety of schedules. Half of the lend-
ers required or requested collateral, broadly defined. Borrowing groups in Mongolia 
have to put 20 percent of the loan amount in a joint savings account before loan 
proceeds are disbursed. Seventy-seven percent of Bosnian borrowers post “collat-
eral,” although in most cases this is just a guarantee provided by the borrower and/
or a co-signer. In Ethiopia the lender’s guideline is to not ask for collateral, but in 
practice most borrowers report, in the endline data, being asked for some.
3 We calculated market interest rates using MIX Market data. The following formulas were used to determine 
APR:
   (i) weekly rate = (% nominal yield on gross portfolio + loan loss rate)/(1 − loan loss rate) × 7/365.25;
(ii) Apr = (1 + weekly rate)  365.25/7 − 1.
For each study, we selected data from the year that was closest to the onset of the treatment and restricted the 
analysis to the ten largest lenders (by gross portfolio) in each country for which data was available. 
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Table 1—Country, Lender, and Loan Information
Study:
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Ethiopia India Mexico Mongolia Morocco
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita 
 (PPP USD)a
$8,431 
(year = 2009)
$507 
(year = 2003)
$3,662 
(year = 2007)
$14,667 
(year = 2010)
$6,109 
(year = 2008)
$5,455 
(year = 2007)
Household annual
 income (PPP USD)
$19,780 $424 $2,700 $7,828 $1,620 $5,059
Implementing lender Not revealed Oromiya Credit 
and Savings 
Share Company, 
Amhara Credit 
and Savings 
Institute 
Spandana Compartamos 
Banco 
XacBank Al Amana
Lender organization 
 type
n/a Nonprofit For-profit For-profit For-profit Nonprofit
Lender amount of 
 microloan debt  
  outstanding in  
   2012 (USD)b 
n/a $91.9 million (Oromiya), 
$194.6 million 
(Amhara)
$409.6 million $1.1 billion $462.1 million $229.8 million
Region 14 regions 
throughout 
country 
2 Western 
regions
1 major 
metropolitan 
area 
(Hyderabad)
4 regions in 
North-Central 
Sonora
5 Northern 
regions
11 regions 
throughout 
country
Rural or Urban? Both Rural Urban Both Rural Rural
Gender of borrowers Male, Female Male, Female Female Female Female Male, Female
Targeted to  
 microentrepreneurs?
Yes (91 percent 
of respondents 
planned to 
invest in new 
or existing 
business)
Yes (Plans for 
starting business 
considered 
“salient” criteria 
for loan grant)
No Yes (Has 
business or 
interested in 
starting one)
Yes Yes
Loan eligibility Sufficient 
collateral, 
repayment 
capacity, credit 
worthiness, 
business 
capacity, credit 
history, other 
(including 
characteristics)
Poverty status, 
viable business 
plan, and other 
criteria
Women ages 
18–59 who have 
resided in the 
same area for at 
least one year 
and have valid 
identification 
and residential 
proof (at least 
80 percent of 
women in a 
group must own 
their home)
Women ages 
18–60 with 
proof of address 
and valid 
identification
Women who 
own less than 
MNT 1 million 
($869 exchange 
rate) in assets 
and earn less 
than MNT 
200,000 ($174 
exchange rate) 
in monthly 
profits from a 
business
Men and 
women ages 
18–70 who 
hold a national 
ID card, have 
a residency 
certificate, 
and have had 
an economic 
activity 
other than 
nonlivestock 
agriculture for 
at least  
12 months
Sampling frame Marginal loan 
applicants 
considered 
too risky and 
“unreliable” 
to be offered 
credit as regular 
borrowers under 
the terms above
Random 
selection of 
households
Households 
with at least 
one woman age 
18–55 that have 
resided in the 
same area for at 
least three years
Mexican women 
ages 18–60 
who either have 
a business/
economic 
activity, would 
start one if they 
had enough 
money, or would 
consider taking 
credit from an 
institution 
Women who 
met eligibility 
criteria and 
signed up to 
declare interest 
in receiving loan 
from lender
(1) 
Households 
deemed likely 
borrowers, 
(2) random 
selection of 
households
(Continued )
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In each case the lending function—the provision of liquidity—is performed by the 
lender (i.e., these are not ROSCAs). The seven lenders across these studies include 
a mix of for-profits (India, Mexico, and Mongolia) and nonprofits. Most of the 
Table 1—Country, Lender, and Loan Information (Continued )
Study:
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Ethiopia India Mexico Mongolia Morocco
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan term length Average 14 
months
12 months 12 months 4 months 3–12 months 
group (average 
6 months); 
2–24 months 
individual 
(average 
8 months)
3–18 months 
(average 16 
months) 
Repayment frequency Monthly Borrowers were 
expected to 
make regular 
deposits and 
repayments
Weekly Weekly Monthly Weekly, twice 
monthly, or 
monthly
Interest ratec 22 percent 
APR 
12 percent 
APR
24 percent APR 
(12 percent 
nondeclining) 
110 percent 
APR 
26.8 percent 
APR
14.5 percent 
APR
Market interest rateb 27.3 percent 
APR
24.7 percent 
APR
15.9 percent 
APR
145.0 percent 
APR
42.5 percent 
APR
46.3 percent 
APR
Liability Individual 
lending
Group (joint 
liability)
Group (joint 
liability)
Group (joint 
liability)
Two treatment 
arms: group 
(joint liability) 
and individual
Group (joint 
liability)
Group size No data No data 6–10 people 10–50 people 7–15 people 3–4 people
Collateralized Yes (77 percent) Yes (majority 
asked to 
provide)
No No Yes (100 
percent) for 
group loans, 
often for 
individual loans
No (yes for 
few individual 
loans)
Loan loss rate 
 at baselineb
No data 0.3 percent 
(Oromiya), 
0.0 percent 
(Amhara)
2.0 percent 3.2 percent 0.1 percent 0.5 percent
Initial treatment loan 
 size (local currency)
Average 1,653, 
median 1,500 
(2009 BAM)
Median 1,200 
(2006 birr) 10,000 (2007 Rs)
Average 3,946 
(2010 peso)
Average group: 
320,850 (per 
borrower), 
average 
individual: 
472,650 
(2008 MNT)
Average 5,920 
(2007 MAD)
Initial treatment loan 
 size (PPP USD)
Average $1,816, 
median $1,648
Median ~$500 $603 Average $451 Average $696 
(group), 
average $472 
(individual) 
Average $1,082
Loan size as a 
 proportion of 
  income
Average 
9 percent, 
median 
8 percent
118 percent 22 percent 6 percent 43 percent 
(group), 
29 percent 
(individual)
21 percent
Better terms (greater 
 amount and/or 
  lower interest 
   rate) on 
    subsequent 
     loans
No data No data Yes Yes Yes No data
a Source: World Bank 
b Source: MIX Market
c APR calculated using the upper bound of the interest rate ranges reported for each study (when applicable).
VoL.7 no.1 7banerjee et al.: six randomized evaluations of microcredit
 microlenders in these studies can be described as large: 5 of the 6 for which we have 
data have at least $190 million in microloans outstanding as of 2012 ($190 million 
is the ninety-third percentile of microloans outstanding in MixMarket.org data), and 
the anonymous Bosnian microlender is described as a large MFI by the researchers. 
As of 2012, the Mexican lender was one of three publicly traded microlenders in 
the world.
All told, the six settings represented in this volume strike us as fairly representa-
tive of the distribution of lenders, loan terms, borrowers, and markets that comprise 
the microcredit world. MixMarket.org and MFTransparency.org are useful sources 
of comparison data.
Table 2—Study Information and Results
Study:
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Ethiopia India Mexico Mongolia Morocco
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Baseline survey date December 2008–
May 2009
2003 2005 April 2010 (for 
panel sample)
February 2008 April 2006–
December 2007
Treatment start date December 2008–
May 2009
2003 2006–2007 April 2009 (June 
2010 for panel 
sample)
March 2008 2006
Panel data Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Treatment end date February–July 
2010
March–July 
2006
August 2007–
April 2008
November 
2011–March 
2012
September 2009 2009
Unit of randomization 1,196 individual 
applicants
133 peasant 
associations
104 
neighborhoods
238 clusters 
(neighborhoods 
or villages)
40 villages 162 villages
Endline 1 survey 
 sample size
995 6,263 6,862 16,560 
(additional cross 
sectional endline 
surveys)
964 5,551 
(additional 
endline 
surveys)
Panel (endline 1) 
 response rate
83 percent 
(995/1,196) n/a
74 percent 63 percent 
(1,823/2,912)
84 percent 
(964/1,148)
92 percent 
(4,118/4,465)
Endline 2 survey 
 sample size
n/a n/a 6,142 n/a n/a n/a
Panel (endline 2) 
 response rate
n/a n/a 89.5 percent n/a n/a n/a
Time between 
 treatment, endline 
  survey 1
14 months 36 months 15–18 months Average 
exposure 
16 months
19 months 24 months
Time between 
 baseline, endline 
  survey 2
n/a n/a 39–42 months n/a 43 months (follow-up 
with smaller 
sample—
3 villages)
n/a
Loan take-up in 
 treatment (from 
  study lender 
   only)
100 percent 31 percent 18 percent 
endline 1, 17 
percent endline 2
19 percent 57 percent 
group, 50 
percent 
individual
17 percent
Repayment rates 46 percent late 
repayment, 
26 percent 
written off
No data At endline 1, 
43 percent of 
control group 
and 49 percent 
of treatment 
group were 
ever late for a 
payment
90-day 
delinquency rate 
of 9.8 percent, 
default rate 
about 1 percent
7 percent group, 
5 percent 
individual 
90-day 
individual 
delinquency rate
No data
Randomization 
 process
Across 
individuals, after 
baseline survey
Across clusters, 
after baseline 
survey
Across clusters, 
after baseline 
survey
Across clusters Across clusters, 
after baseline 
survey
Across clusters, 
after baseline 
survey
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III. Research Methodology
The motivation for relying on randomized variation to identify microcredit 
impacts is pretty standard: concerns about selection biases. In the case of microcre-
dit one should worry about both supply- and demand-side biases.
Concerns about demand-side selection biases stem from the likelihood that peo-
ple who choose to borrow may be different, or trending differently, than those who 
choose not to borrow. If these differences are unobserved—not fully controlled 
for—by the econometrician, and correlated with downstream outcomes of interest, 
then estimates of the effects of microcredit will be biased: they will not capture true 
causal effects.
Biases can go in either direction. People may borrow when they have experi-
enced, or expect to experience, a negative shock, à la the “Ashfenfelter dip” in job 
training. This will produce downward bias: impact estimates will be lower (less 
positive) than their true causal effects. But we could also get an upward bias: people 
may borrow when they expect an improvement, or because they are more capable in 
ways that are difficult to measure, à la the longstanding concern with the confound-
ing effects of “spirit” and “spunk” in studies of labor markets and entrepreneurship.4
Similarly, concerns about supply-side selection biases stem from the likelihood 
that lenders, like borrowers, make strategic decisions based on factors that are diffi-
cult for researchers to fully observe. Lenders choose which neighborhoods and mar-
kets to enter, and depending on their motivation may thus select relatively vibrant 
and growing markets (because of profitability) or stagnant and particularly poor 
markets (because of social concerns). Lenders (and/or borrowers, in the case of 
group lending) also select or ration from a pool of prospective borrowers; again, 
selection biases can go in either direction, depending on the objective function of 
whomever is doing the underwriting.
While all the studies discussed here are randomized control trials, there are actu-
ally two types of experimental designs here. Five of the studies use randomized 
program placement. The Bosnia study uses individual-level randomization.
Randomized program placement requires lenders (or lenders alongside research-
ers) to identify a large set of communities (or neighborhoods) and randomly assign 
each community to either treatment or control. Lenders then employ one or more 
levers for ensuring that those in areas assigned to treatment end up being more 
likely to be offered a loan. One lever is an approach often used in encouragement 
designs—marketing only (or more intensively) in treatment areas. Another lever is 
using address verification to try to prevent people in control areas from borrowing. 
Of course, even applying both of these levers does not guarantee perfect supply-side 
compliance with the treatment assignment (we discuss demand-side issues affecting 
power below). For example, the lender’s field staff may have incentives to deviate, 
and address verification may be gameable (home versus work addresses may fall in 
different communities, etc.). This is one reason why it is important to verify whether 
and how much random assignment to treatment predicts increased borrowing from 
4 See Beaman et al. (2014) for empirical evidence that there is selection on returns. 
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the lender; i.e., to test how strong the threshold component of the first stage is. A 
study should have sufficiently large effects here to have hope of identifying down-
stream effects of borrowing or credit access.
The Bosnia study uses credit scoring to engineer individual-level randomization, 
similar to Karlan and Zinman (2010, 2011). This approach typically randomizes 
applicants who are deemed by the lender to be on the margin of creditworthiness. 
Individual-level randomization can present compliance challenges as well, particu-
larly in cases where loan officers retain some operational freedom to deviate from 
the random assignment and/or individuals have outside options that depress take-up 
rates conditional on applying.5
The two different levels of randomization each have their advantages and disad-
vantages. Randomized program placement offers the potential benefit of capturing 
treatment effects at the community level (more precisely, at the level of the unit of 
randomization). In many cases this level of analysis is more interesting because 
it internalizes any spillovers or general equilibrium effects that occur within the 
community (see the Morocco paper for a direct analysis of such spillovers). As 
long as such effects are contained within communities (no cross-community spill-
overs),6 randomized program placement thus addresses an important challenge in 
identifying the impact of microcredit: nonborrowers may be affected as well, either 
positively or negatively. Individual-level randomization, on its own, is not well-
suited to measuring spillovers or general equilibrium effects. In principle, however, 
one could combine the two levels of randomization—for instance, by randomly 
approving 10 percent of marginal rejects in some communities, and 90 percent in 
other communities—to capture the community-level effects in situations where 
 individual-level randomization is attractive for other reasons (see below).
The main downside of randomized program placement is typically a loss of 
statistical power, in large part because take-up rates are relatively low. Take-up 
rate differentials between treatment and control—the primary determinant of sta-
tistical power—are as low as 9 percent among the studies here. In contrast, with 
 individual-level randomization, it is easier to create a sample of people who have 
already expressed interest in credit (e.g., by applying for it), and thus obtain rela-
tively high differential take-up rates. In some cases this boils down to a budget issue 
where one can offset lower power by increasing the sample size. In other cases 
increasing sample size may not be operationally feasible.7
5 As is always the case, one must consider the sources and magnitudes of imperfect compliance with random 
assignment when interpreting treatment effect estimates. 
6 A promising way to test the assumption of no cross-community spillovers is to use an additional randomiza-
tion, varying the intensity of credit offering across (groups of) treated communities. This randomization was done 
in the Mexico study and is the subject of work-in-progress. 
7 Aside from the potential power benefit, the main advantage of individual-level randomization is that it is 
becoming relatively attractive to lenders over time. In contrast, opportunities for randomizing program placement 
in tandem with planned geographic expansions may dry up as microcredit markets approach maturity/saturation. 
Many lenders are adopting credit scoring models and are open to the proposition that experimentation delivers 
bottom-line benefits in the form of model refinements. This approach could even work for group lending, either as 
an input to group screening or as automation of final-stage underwriting in cases where the lender retains discretion 
to deny loans approved by a group.
It is also important to note that the two approaches will often estimate treatment effects on different margins 
of borrowers. Randomized program placement typically identifies effects of credit expansion to new communities. 
Individual-level randomization typically identifies effects of credit expansion (or contraction) within markets that 
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IV. What Do the Studies Find?
In summarizing and distilling results across the six papers in this issue, we follow 
the papers in focusing on average intent-to-treat effects. We also provide a bit of 
discussion on treatment-on-the-treated and heterogeneous effects. Where applicable 
we focus on the outcomes measured at the second of two endline surveys, unless 
otherwise noted.
Each of the six studies starts by estimating treatment effects on credit access and 
usage (Tables 2a and 2b in each paper), as these are a first stage of sorts for establish-
ing the plausibility of effects on downstream outcomes. There are three challenges 
to engineering a powerful first stage through random assignment, each typical of 
experimental designs that rely on encouragement—rather than compulsion or strong 
added inducements—to use a treatment. One is the potential modest demand for 
microcredit. In practice, these studies estimate take-up rates of study-specific loan 
products ranging from approximately 17 percent to 31 percent among their target 
populations (the Bosnia study, which targeted marginal applicants, had a take-up rate 
of 100 percent, and the Mongolia study, which targeted women who had expressed 
interest in receiving a loan, had take-up rates of 50 percent and 57 percent for indi-
vidual and group products, respectively).
The second challenge combines the first with the challenges of experimental 
implementation: potentially low or modest take-up rate differentials between treat-
ment and control areas. In practice we see this in India, Mexico, and Morocco, 
where treatment effects on the likelihood of borrowing from the implementing MFI 
range from 9 to 12 percentage points. Fortunately each of these studies anticipated 
the modest take-up differential at the research design phase and compensated with a 
large sample size (Mexico) or methods for predicting take-up (India and Morocco). 
The other studies have differentials in roughly the 25 to 50 percentage point range.
The third challenge combines the first two with the potential presence of close sub-
stitutes for the offered treatment: additional microlending is unlikely to have much of 
an effect in a competitive market. This was less a concern in places where researchers 
could be confident ex ante that the study area was largely untouched by other MFIs. 
But in Bosnia, India, and Mexico it is particularly critical to examine whether bor-
rowing from any other MFI goes up to compensate, and each of the studies find that 
it does—modestly in India and Mexico (< 10pp), and quite substantially in Bosnia.
Some of the effects on credit are also interesting in their own right. In particular 
the question of whether expanded access from one MFI substitutes for or comple-
ments other credit sources relates to questions about the nature of liquidity con-
straints, risk-sharing, borrower production functions, and mechanisms producing 
downstream outcomes. For example, findings of complementarity would suggest 
a combination of liquidity constraints still binding and lumpiness in borrower 
opportunity sets, and/or the need to refinance marginal debt instead of paying it off 
( raising concerns about debt traps). Instead, we see some evidence of substitution 
are already being served by the lender. Both margins are interesting, but there may be cases where, for example, 
using individual-level randomization to focus on a relatively narrow margin of borrowers is less interesting for 
policy purposes or more interesting for testing theories. 
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for at least some segment of the borrowers. Informal borrowing falls in the one site 
where it was prevalent at baseline (India). This suggests some substitution of infor-
mal for formal credit—reduced demand—but leaves unanswered the related ques-
tion of whether increased formal access disrupts informal risk-sharing and hence 
the  supply of informal credit. The Mongolia study finds some evidence of partial 
(perhaps 20–25 percent) crowd-out of other formal credit, while none of the other 
studies finds strong effects. In all, there is some evidence of substitution among 
different credit types, and no evidence that expanded access from one MFI leads 
borrowers to take on additional debt from other sources. However, in this and other 
cases, point estimates may conceal important heterogeneity: other credit could be a 
substitute for some borrowers and a complement for other borrowers.
The studies also estimate treatment effects on a large variety and number of 
“downstream” outcomes (study mean number of downstream treatment effects esti-
mated = 50, min = 36, max = 82). Fortunately there is substantial outcome compa-
rability across studies, especially with respect to what we and the studies consider 
particularly key outcomes.
Conducting inference on the effects of microcredit access on downstream out-
comes is complicated by measurement challenges, fungibility, and heterogeneity. 
Measurement error is always a challenge when income or consumption is among the 
main outcomes of interest. Measurement error and reporting biases complicate even 
the seemingly straightforward exercise of identifying how loan proceeds are spent 
(Karlan, Osman, and Zinman 2013). Heterogeneity in loan uses can make some 
effects hard to detect, and standard corrections for multiple hypothesis testing may 
be too conservative. For example, if some households use loans to grow businesses, 
while others use them for consumption smoothing, and still others for solidarity or 
empowerment, then the effects of microcredit will diffuse across multiple outcome 
families, and may be too small to detect on many of the individual outcome fam-
ilies. In light of these issues, we find it unsurprising that none of the studies finds 
statistically significant effects at the 10 percent level on even half of the downstream 
outcomes tested, with a range from 6 percent to 39 percent. Given these challenges, 
the studies in this issue make judicious use of theory and practice to identify espe-
cially key (families of) outcomes.
One key outcome family is microentrepreneurial activity (Table 3 in each of the 
papers). Even though this might be considered more of an intermediate outcome—a 
means to the end of greater utility rather than a great proxy for utility in and of 
itself—the fact that most microlenders target potential microentrepreneurs means 
that treatment effects on entrepreneurship (or at least self-employment) constitute a 
litmus test of sorts. If we do not find increases in business likelihood, size, and/or 
profitability, it is unlikely that microcredit, at least as traditionally defined, is deliv-
ering on its promise of reducing poverty by relaxing credit constraints that inhibit 
business growth. The full picture of evidence suggests at least a partial passing of 
the litmus test. The effects on extensive margins (ownership, starts, closures) are 
modest, with three of the studies finding no effects, Bosnia finding an effect on own-
ership, Mongolia finding an effect on ownership from group borrowing only, and 
India finding an effect on starts at the first endline only that is quite small in level 
terms (although large in percentage terms).
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The effects on measures of investment, business size, and profits, which combine 
the intensive and extensive margins, are more promising. Five of the studies have 
measures of business assets and/or investment, and eight of the ten point estimates on 
these measures are positive, with two of the positive ones (and none of the negatives) 
reaching statistical significance.8 This suggests that the average effect, pooling across 
studies, is likely statistically as well as economically significant. Five of the stud-
ies have measures of revenue and/or expenses, and the point estimates on all 13 of 
these measures are positive, with 6 of them reaching statistical significance.9 Each 
of the studies measures profits, and here we have seven positive point estimates and 
one zero, with one statistically significant result.10 Again, our eyeballing suggests 
that pooling across would yield significant increases in business size and profits.
All told, each study finds at least some evidence, on some margin, that expanded 
access to credit increases business activity.
Another key outcome family is income (Table 4 in each paper); after all, increased 
income is essential to poverty reduction. None of the six studies finds a statistically 
significant increase in total household income, although key point estimates are pos-
itive in four of the six studies.11
The results on income composition are somewhat more encouraging. Of the four 
studies with measures of wage income and business income, two find evidence of 
increases in business income offsetting reductions in wage income. The two remain-
ing studies find increases in both wage and business income. Out of eight point 
estimates of effects on income from remittances/transfers or government aid/ 
benefits, five are negative. These results suggest that although microcredit may not 
be transformative in the sense of lifting people or communities out of poverty, it 
does afford people more freedom in their choices (e.g., of occupation) and the pos-
sibility of being more self-reliant.
Yet another important outcome family is consumption (or, more precisely in 
some cases, consumption expenditures), which is a widely used proxy for living 
standards (Table 6 in each of the papers except Ethiopia, which did not measure 
consumption). The results from the four studies with a measure of total household 
consumption find no evidence of an increase. Three find fairly precise null effects, 
at least in intention-to-treat terms (India, Mongolia, and Morocco). Bosnia finds a 
significant reduction, although this may be due to the fact that most borrowers in the 
sample were still paying back their initial loans (see the theory section, Table 1 re: 
averages for loan term, and Table 2 re: time between treatment onset and endline). 
Each study, including Ethiopia, has some measure of food consumption, and the 
results are mixed at best. Four studies find null effects (though only Morocco can 
rule out effects greater than +/−5 percent of the control group mean), Mongolia 
8 Outcomes from Mongolia are counted twice (joint and individual liability arms). There are two measures that 
were only considered in Ethiopia: value of livestock owned and value of large animals owned. 
9 Again, outcomes from Mongolia are counted twice (joint and individual liability arms). There are three mea-
sures that were only considered in Ethiopia: cash revenues from crops, expenses for crop cultivation, and livestock 
sales. 
10 There is one measure that was only considered in Ethiopia: net revenues from crops. The profit measures in 
the Mongolia paper for respondent businesses only, both of which are negative, are not counted here. 
11 Only one study (Morocco) calculates a point estimate on total household income. For all other studies, total 
household income is derived by summing all reported income components. 
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finds evidence of a modest increase in the group lending treatment, and Ethiopia 
finds evidence of substantial decrease (more precisely, there is an increase in food 
insecurity reported in their Table 7).
Other results on the composition of consumption, as with income, suggest some 
potentially important if not transformative effects. In measuring durable consump-
tion we think it is important to start with measures of durable stocks rather than 
expenditures, since increases in the latter may indicate increased churn of assets 
from the strain of the debt service (see the Mexico paper for a discussion of this 
issue, and Morocco’s Table 4 for related evidence of a decline in asset sales). The 
three studies that measure durable stock(s) find mixed results. In Mongolia, micro-
credit access increases the stock of household durables (the effect is statistically 
significant in the individual lending treatment). In Bosnia and India, however, 
microcredit decreases the stock of durables, and the effect is statistically significant 
in Bosnia. One robust finding on consumption is a decrease in discretionary spend-
ing (temptation goods, recreation/entertainment/celebrations). Five of the studies 
estimate treatment effects on ten such measures, finding seven negative point esti-
mates, three of which are statistically significant. Whether this belt-tightening is 
indicative of improved self-discipline, changes in bargaining power within the fam-
ily, the lumpiness of investment, and/or some other mechanism is an open question. 
Another robust finding on expenditures is the lack of significant effects on other 
types of spending (health and education), although many of these nulls are impre-
cisely estimated.
The final outcome family we consider focuses on social indicators (Table 7 in 
each of the papers). Two particularly important outcomes here are child schooling 
(as an indicator of child welfare and leading indicator of family income growth) 
and female empowerment. Each of the six studies estimates treatment effects on 
schooling, and the effects are a mix of more and less precisely estimated nulls. 
The one exception is Bosnia, which finds a significant decline in school attendance 
among 16–19-year-olds. Four of the studies estimate effects on female decision 
power and/or independence within the household, and three find no effect. India’s 
null is precisely estimated (in intent-to-treat terms at least), ruling out effects larger 
than +/−0.05 standard deviations. Mexico finds a small but significant increase in 
female decision power.
Other results from Mexico (Tables 7 and 8) raise the possibility of meaningful 
effects on other aspects of subjective well-being: happiness and trust in others each 
increase by an estimated 0.05 standard deviations, although many other indicators 
are unaffected. All told, the studies find no evidence of transformative effects on 
social indicators, but do find some hints of positive effects on female empowerment 
and well-being, at least in Mexico.
The full picture of the evidence suggests several tentative conclusions. 
Reassuringly, these echo the conclusions in a previous survey which covers a num-
ber of studies not in this issue (Banerjee 2013).
First, there is little evidence of transformative effects. The studies do not find 
clear evidence, or even much in the way of suggestive evidence, of reductions in 
poverty or substantial improvements in living standards. Nor is there robust evi-
dence of improvements in social indicators.
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Second, the lack of transformative effects is not for lack of trying in the sense 
of investment in business growth. There is pretty strong evidence that businesses 
expand, though the extent of expansion may be limited, and there are hints (eye-
balling the pattern of positive coefficients across studies) that profits increase. The 
evidence on why expansion does not produce strong evidence of increases in house-
hold living standards is mixed: some studies find evidence suggesting that house-
holds trade off business income for wage income, while others suggest that larger 
businesses are no more profitable, even in level terms, than smaller ones (at least on 
average; we discuss heterogeneity below).
Third, the lack of transformative effects should not obscure other more modest, 
but potentially important, effects. The studies find some, if not entirely robust, 
evidence of effects on occupational choice, business scale, consumption choice, 
female decision power, and improved risk management. As we stated previously, 
if microcredit’s promise were increasing freedom of choice it would be closer to 
delivering on it.
Fourth, just as there is little support for microcredit’s strongest claims, there is 
also little support for microcredit’s harshest critics. The studies find little evidence 
of harmful effects, even with individual lending (Bosnia, Mongolia), and even at a 
high real interest rate (Mexico).
Fifth, the limited analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects in these studies does 
suggest the possibility of transformative effects—good for some, bad for others—
on segments of microlenders’ target populations. Morocco and India find evidence 
of large positive effects on business profits in the right tail of the distribution, and 
Morocco finds negative effects on the left tail. Mexico finds an increase in financial 
decision power among the left tail. Bosnia finds a decrease in teen schooling among 
lower educated households. Microcredit’s strongest supporters and harshest critics 
may each be correct for segments of borrowers, if not on average.
Finally, we emphasize that many of these inferences lack precision, at least 
at the level of individual studies. Many of the null results are part of confidence 
intervals that contain economically meaningful effect sizes in one or both direc-
tions. Most of the null results would lack precision if they were converted into 
 treatment-on-the-treated units. Statistical power still poses a major challenge to 
microcredit impact studies, although there are many hopeful indicators for future 
work, including the progress in the India and Morocco studies in predicting take-up, 
the Mexico study in obtaining a large sample size, and the prospect of pooling data 
across studies.
V. Some Simple Theory
The results reported above highlight the fact that many things change when 
a family gets access to microcredit. Even if microcredit is beneficial, we do not 
expect all things to change in the same direction at the same time. The model in 
this section provides a simple framework for thinking about potentially diffuse 
and dynamic impacts of microcredit. The basic idea of the model is that potential 
borrowers have a lumpy expenditure opportunity that would generate benefits both 
in the present and the future. Additional credit facilitates that investment because, 
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otherwise, the required cut in present consumption to finance the investment may 
be unacceptably large.
As long as the marginal amount borrowed is not too large, expanded access 
to microloans can create interesting dynamics for borrowers. They may cut con-
sumption (including leisure) in the short run, and may permanently reduce cer-
tain types of consumption (while increasing others). Labor supply may also go 
up in the short run to mitigate the negative effect of consumption, but may go 
down thereafter. In other words, neither an immediate fall in consumption nor an 
eventual fall in labor supply is necessarily evidence that microcredit has failed to 
deliver the goods.
The results on the (lack of) impact on consumption spending could be construed 
as broadly consistent with this prediction of the model. Perhaps some borrowers 
have already gained in terms of consumption while others are currently consuming 
less but will consume more later so that there is no net effect. Similarly, while we 
do not emphasize changes in labor supply, the India study does find an increase in 
labor supply on the first round of data collection, which goes away by the second 
round. Of course, all these interpretations are subject to the concern that we do not 
know how to define “short run” and “long run.” For example, five of the six studies 
have endline data collected after enough time has elapsed for several loan cycles. 
Is this short enough to capture short-run effects or should we think of all the mea-
sured effects reported here as long-run effects? We return to this question in the 
Conclusion.
A. Basic model
A consumer “lives” for two periods. She can spend money on two goods, which 
we will call nondurable and durable. The nondurable is fully divisible and is con-
sumed during the period in which it is bought. Denote nondurable consumption by 
c n . The durable lasts for two periods, and yields durable services in both periods. If 
it is a business durable then the services are just outputs of the consumption good; 
if it is a consumer durable they are flows of instantaneous consumption emanating 
from the durable.
The durable is indivisible, costs an amount  c d , and yields durable services of 
 a c d in each period. Moreover there are no additional benefits from owning a second 
durable. Assume that durable services and nondurables are perfect substitutes, in 
the sense that the consumer’s per-period utility function is  u(c), where  c =  c n if 
she has not purchased the durable in the current or previous period, and  c =  c n + 
a c d otherwise, and that  0 < a < 1. Therefore, in the current period, purchasing 
the durable leads to a net loss in flow utility, but it might still be optimal because 
a could be greater than  1/2. The consumer discounts the future at rate  δ and maxi-
mizes the total of present and discounted future utility.
The consumer earns a labor income of  y in units of the nondurable every period 
and there is no savings, so the total amount  y is spent every period. However, the 
household has the option of borrowing up to an amount  b max for one period at a 
gross interest rate  r . We assume that the durable costs more than the maximum pos-
sible amount of debt:  c d >  b max .
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B. Analysis of the model
It turns out that we can study the consumer’s decision diagrammatically. In 
Figure 1, the horizontal axis represents consumption in period 1 and the vertical 
axis is consumption in period 2.  uu and  u ′ u ′ are two potential indifference curves. 
They both have slope  1/δ when they intersect the 45 degree line,  o o ′ , at points  E 
and  E ′ . The point  E represents the endowment, the vector  ( y, y) . The line  EF , which 
has the slope  r , represents the set of options open to the consumer if she borrows in 
period 1 but does not purchase the durable. The distance along the horizontal direc-
tion from  E to  F represents  b max , the maximum possible loan size. As drawn, we are 
assuming that  r < 1/δ, which gives the consumer a reason to borrow—the highest 
indifference curve reachable on  EF is typically higher than the one through  E . 
Another option is to buy the durable without borrowing. The point  A represents 
this case, i.e., it is the point  ( y − (1 − a) c d , y + a c d ). 
The third option is to borrow and buy the durable. The line segment  AB represents 
the set of choices for someone who does so. The horizontal distance from  A to  B is 
b max and the slope of the line is  r . As drawn, it is clear that the point  B lies on the 
highest indifference curve that is available and the consumer will choose both to 
borrow and to buy the durable. However, her first-period consumption is still lower 
than at point  E . Total consumption goes down in the first period as a result of pur-
chasing the durable.
However, this is not the only possibility. The point  B ′ represents what happens 
when  b max is higher ( F ′ is the corresponding point where the consumer borrows 
δ
c2
c1
O yy − (1 − a)cd
y − (1 − a)cd + bmax
y + bmax
A
B
U
F
U
r
E
F′
E′
F″
U′
U′
B′
O′
B″
Figure 1. Interest Rate < Time Preference
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without purchasing the durable). In this case, borrowing and buying the durable is 
still the best option, but total consumption goes up in both periods. Finally, the point 
B″ represents the case where  b max is small. F ″ is the corresponding value in the case 
where there is no durable purchase. In this case, borrowing without buying the dura-
ble is the best option, and first-period consumption goes up.
Figure 2 captures the case where  rδ > 1. In this case there is no reason to 
just borrow—the line  EF lies everywhere under the indifference curve through  E . 
However, borrowing to buy the durable still makes sense and improves welfare.
In general, more credit (weakly) increases the incentive to buy the durable rel-
ative to either not buying but borrowing or not buying and not borrowing. To see 
this denote the utility of buying the durable as  v d ( b max ) , and that of not buying the 
durable by  v n ( b max ). 
  d ____ 
d b max  v d ( b max ) = max  { d __ db  [u( y − (1 − a) c d + b) + δu( y +  c d − rb)] , 0} 
  = max  { u ′ ( y − (1 − a) c d + b) − δr u ′ ( y + a c d − rb), 0} ,
which, by the concavity of  u is always at least as large as  
d v n ( b max ) ______
d b max  = max { d __ db [u( y + 
b) + δu( y − rb)], 0} = max{ u ′ ( y + b) − δru( y − rb), 0} . Therefore this is also 
true at the point where  v d ( b max ) =  v n ( b max ), which tells us that if at any level of 
δ
c2
c1
O yy − (1 − a)cd
y − (1 − a)cd + bmax
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F U
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Figure 2. Interest Rate > Time Preference
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 b max ,  v d ( b max ) >  v n ( b max ), then this is also true at all higher values of  b max . In this 
sense, increased access to credit favors buying the durable.
Moreover, it is evident that when the consumer switches to buying the durable 
as a result of increased credit access, her borrowing must go up. Hence, compared 
to someone who has less credit access, her second-period nondurable consumption, 
y − rb , must be lower.
Result 1: Compare two people, one of whom has better access to credit. She is 
more likely to buy the durable, but her first-period total nondurable consumption 
and even total consumption may be higher or lower. If she buys a consumer durable, 
her second-period nondurable consumption will be lower. If she buys a business 
durable, her second-period nondurable consumption will be higher.
If the durable is for business, then it makes sense to think of a higher  a as a more 
productive project. For a high enough  a , the investment will be made even when 
access to credit is very limited or absent. Conversely, increased access to credit will 
encourage consumers with relatively low values of  a to invest.
Result 2: Increased access to credit increases the likelihood that the consumer 
makes a fixed investment, but reduces the average product of the projects that get 
implemented.
Next, consider a variant of the model where the consumer also has a labor supply 
decision. Assume that the consumer can earn  w units of nondurable consumption per 
unit of labor and supplies  l 1 and  l 2 units of labor in periods 1 and 2. The disutility of 
labor is given by the function  v(l ) which is assumed to be increasing, convex, dif-
ferentiable everywhere and satisfying the Inada condition at  l = 0. The consumer 
now maximizes
  u(y − (1 − a) c d + b + w l 1 ) − v( l 1 ) + δ [u( y +  c d − rb + w l 2 ) − v( l 2 )] 
if she buys the durable and
  u( y + b + w l 1 ) − v( l 1 ) + δ[u( y − rb + w l 2 ) − v( l 2 )] 
if not.
By our assumptions about  v, an interior optimum for  l always exists and is given by
  u ′ (c) =  v ′ (l) . 
It is evident that  l is decreasing in  c. Furthermore, if  u l (x) = ma x l {u(x + wl) − 
v(l)}, it is easy to show that  u l (x) inherits the concavity of  u(c) and therefore 
Result 1 extends to this case. In other words, improved loan access may lead to a 
reduction in nondurable and even total consumption in the first period. If total con-
sumption goes down, labor supply will go up in that period.
Result 3: Increased access to credit can lead to an increase in labor supply in the 
first period.
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Finally, the assumption that durables and nondurables are perfect substitutes is 
convenient for diagrammatic analysis but not essential for our results. Suppose, on 
the contrary, durable consumption of  c d leads to a utility equal to the service flow 
from the durable  a c d , which is separable from the utility from nondurables. Then 
it is easily shown by following the same argument that Result 1 will still hold. The 
only change is that now labor supply only depends on nondurable consumption, and 
since nondurable consumption can be lower in both periods, labor supply may be 
permanently raised by improved credit access.12
Result 4: If durables and nondurables are not perfect substitutes, increased access 
to credit may raise labor supply in both periods.
VI. Further Research
The six studies in this paper greatly add to the evidentiary foundation on the 
impacts of microcredit. But they stop short of fully answering many questions, high-
lighting several lines of inquiry for research going forward.
One is continuing to develop methods that address the power challenges seem-
ingly inherent to encouragement designs. The India and Morocco studies in this 
volume make encouraging strides.
A second is to continue exploring impacts—on borrowing and spending deci-
sions, and downstream outcomes—at different horizons, from the very short run 
(Karlan, Osman, and Zinman 2013) to even longer horizons than those studied here. 
It should be noted that many of the studies in this volume do consider the long run 
in a sense: they measure impacts after several (potential) loan cycles have elapsed. 
Moreover, looking across studies, there is little evidence of treatment effects on 
investments with relatively long gestation periods, such as education or health, and 
there is little evidence of transformative effects on social indicators—e.g., decision 
power, locus of control—that might later feed back into greater success in other 
domains/outcome families. There is also a practical challenge in studying long-run 
impacts: absent a strong motivation to do so, and with evidence that microcredit 
delivers some benefits, the case for withholding microcredit from a control group 
for several (more) years weakens. Having said that, two longer run follow-ups to the 
experiments in this volume are in the works: the India team conducted surveys seven 
years post-random assignment, and the Morocco team is in the field for another 
 follow-up survey, eight year post-random assignment.
A third line of inquiry is to continue exploring whether and why results repli-
cate across different “settings,” which we define loosely as credit delivery mod-
els  (for-profit versus nonprofit; joint versus individual liability, etc.), credit terms, 
market conditions, and borrower characteristics. The studies here offer impressive 
variety in settings, and do not produce strong evidence that effects vary substantially 
across settings, but there is more work to do. Studies of external validity would ben-
efit from greater interplay between theory that generates predictions on where and 
12 The same result also holds when instead of durables and nondurables, the consumer chooses between a divis-
ible consumption good and a nondivisible one (say, a wedding). 
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why microcredit should work best and empirical work that tests those predictions. 
More broadly, there are probably bridges to build between work on microcredit and 
other small-dollar credit markets for consumers and their closely held businesses, 
and between work on these markets and the many literatures that touch on some 
aspect of whether and why markets supply credit (in)efficiently (Zinman 2014).
Fourth, and closely related, is the identification and interpretation of hetero-
geneous treatment effects on (potential) borrowers. In particular there is growing 
concern among policymakers, advocates, and funders that one or more behavioral 
tendencies leads some, perhaps many, people to do themselves more harm than good 
by borrowing. It is worth emphasizing that there is scant evidence on how behavioral 
tendencies actually mediate credit impacts (Zinman 2014), and in any case, the pres-
ence of behavioral deviations from rationality may in some cases strengthen the case 
for microcredit rather than weaken it (Banerjee and Mullainathan 2010; Bernheim, 
Ray, and Yeltekin 2013; Mullainathan and Shafir 2013; Carrell and Zinman 2014). 
More broadly, we believe that understanding distributional effects is important in a 
world with growing concerns about debt traps, and here the increasing potential to 
develop screening and targeting technologies that maximize benefits while minimiz-
ing harm offers exciting possibilities.
Fifth, as some of the studies note, we have only scratched the surface of identify-
ing spillover and general equilibrium effects. Much as modest intent-to-treat effects 
could obscure heterogeneity in effects on different types of borrowers (as discussed 
directly above), they could also or instead obscure heterogeneity in effects on bor-
rowers and nonborrowers. Nonborrowing businesses could be harmed by business 
stealing, or benefit from agglomeration. Nonborrowing wage earners could benefit 
from increased employment opportunities or lower prices, or be harmed if success-
ful borrowers acquire market power. The Morocco study shows one method for 
pursuing some of these questions, and the Mexico study includes randomized varia-
tion in treatment intensity that should allow the identification of spillover effects in 
future work, but there is much more to do.
Sixth, the studies here identify impacts on marginal but not inframarginal borrow-
ers (e.g., on those who borrowed before the studies here started). This is a strength in 
the sense that marginal borrowers are the focus of much theory, practice, and policy. 
But it is a weakness in the sense that impacts on inframarginal borrowers are key to 
understanding the totality of microcredit’s success or failure as a development tool. 
Different methods will be required to identify impacts on inframarginal borrowers.
Seventh, despite its success in numbers, microcredit institutions could innovate 
more; in particular, discovering lending models that match more closely to cash 
flow needs of borrowers may prove more transformative. Field et al. (2013), for 
example, demonstrates that in India, delaying the initial payment gives borrowers 
the opportunity to make larger durable investments, and thus improves short- and 
long-run income for enterprises. In Mali, Beaman et al. (2014) shows that agricul-
tural lending with payments matched to the cash flows of farms (i.e., repayment at 
harvest, not immediately after loan disbursal in weekly or monthly payments) can 
lead to increased investment and farm revenues. The nonprofit sector led innovation 
in microcredit to get the industry to where it is today, and could further lead the 
industry in exploring innovations to improve the impact on the poor (Karlan 2014).
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Finally, we emphasize that the microcredit studies in this volume are silent on the 
impacts of many other promising noncredit microfinance activities. Many microf-
inance institutions (MFIs) now focus on savings, not just credit, and the evidence 
from randomized evaluations of microsavings is quite promising (Karlan, Ratan, 
and Zinman 2013). MFIs have also been expanding into other payments media 
(Jack and Suri 2011) and insurance (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Karlan et al. 
2014), making them increasingly bank-like (Burgess and Pande 2005). The impacts 
of modern microfinance on the lives of the poor and vulnerable are still unfolding, 
and we hope that researchers will continue working to help identify and shape them.
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